Civil-military interaction in
EU crisis management
Conceptual underpinnings and policy options towards „CMNEW"

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Starting point

- The European Union describes itself as a global actor to whose USP belongs a determination and capability to devise and perform **comprehensive conflict management** within and beyond the ESDP framework. This also applies to crisis response and crisis prevention (with the term **crisis management** covering both dimensions and crisis, for the purpose followed here, defined as violently manifest conflict process)

- The EU expects this comprehensiveness to have positive feedback on its **internal consolidation** (cf. ESS: more active, coherent, capable and interactive Union)

- Policy analysis and military policy tend to identify two levels on which civil-military interaction is organized within the ESDP context:

   CMCO (political-strategic level) and **CIMIC** (tactical-operational level)

- Much as such a clear-cut distinction contributes to prevent conceptual confusion, it misses some EU-typical challenges in civil-military interaction

Foundational ideas and challenges of EU crisis mangement

- Pillar-overarching endeavour that also requires, e.g., civil-civil co-ordination within the EU system (cf. Council-Commission split)
- Multifunctional crisis management
- Gap between political-strategic crisis management concept (CMC) and in-theatre implementation by mere ad-hoc interlocking needs to be bridged
- **Civil/military** interaction has no fixed interfaces but is multi-dimensional and needs **networking** rather than co-ordination:

Dimensions/types of actors in civil/military networking

|	civil	military
intern (acting in the crisis area)	remaining structures of former governmental executive and legislative bodies; newly forming agencies and authorities (e.g. transitory government bodies, committees); local civil society	regular military forces; irregular forces; warlord troops
extern (part of an international intervention of intervening individually)	international organisations; mandated NGOs; unmandated NGOs/PVOs; governmental organisations (e.g. USAID)	entry and enabling forces (e.g. NRF, ERRF); coalitions of the willing; international forces deployed on the basis of a UN mandate; international forces deployed at the request of the government of a stabilized de-facto regime

Cf. Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (Deza): Improving International Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Emergencies. Draft Swiss Proposal. Bern, 2002.

- ## E.g. civil-military end-state oriented practices
  ("enlarged" CIMIC, cf. VIKING 99, http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/conccim.html)

  - "The short term aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the civilian population and institutions within a commander's area of operation in order to create the civil/military conditions that offer him the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages."
  - "The long term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievements of a lasting solution to the crises."

What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (2/5)

- ## E.g. strategic/operational culture,
  cf. NATO International Military Staff: NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm, § 8

  "Further, NATO commanders must take into account the presence of increasingly large numbers of international and non-governmental civilian organisations. These demanding circumstances may be further complicated by difference in culture and mandate between the military and civilian organizations concerned."

What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (3/5)

Civil and military PSO domains and fields of co-ordination

Civil crisis management characteristics	Military crisis management characteristics
initially dependent on the military providing a secure environment; own contribution to maintaining a secure environment is a follow-up task	providing a secure environment as elementary initial task
decentralized organization and informal co-ordination as operating principles	hierarchical organization as operating principle
humanity, responsiveness, human-needs-orientation, neutrality – also as principles in order to maintain one's own security	professionalism and efficiency: universal culture in action and routines, independent of specific conditions
confrontation avoidance	routine-based acceptance and processing of confrontation
long-term horizon, sustainability	systematic planning, including the formulation of exit strategies
Endogenous standards of success, largely adapted to the situation	exogenous, generalized standards of success

What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (4/5)

problems and misfits in civil-military interaction from a civilian point of view	problems and misfits in civil-military interaction from a military point of view
civil-military interaction should be flexible and adaptable according to changing mission needs	civil-military interaction should be institutionalized
civil-military comprehensiveness in crisis management brings the risk of loosing ones position as self-relying actor with an own mandate and being degraded to a mere instrument; as a consequence, comprehensiveness should not be followed at a strategic, but at an operational level	because of its mission to provide a secure environment and comprehensive contingency planning, military actors perform overarching tasks
military actors often lack commitment for endangered societies; military is rather part of the problem then of the solution	civil actors do not operate on the basis of clear priorities and follow hidden agendas; co-operating with them amplifies the problem of mission creep

Reading

Daniel L. Byman: Uncertain Partners: NGO and the Military, in:
Survival 43 (2001), Nr. 2, S. 97-114

Karl W. Haltiner: Policemen or Soldier? Organizational Dilemmas of Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations, in: Gerhard Kümmel (Hg.): The Challenging Continuity of Change and the Military. Forum Internationales, Nr. 22. Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2001, S. 359-384

Sascha Hardegger: Cimic-Doktrin im Spannungsfeld zwischen humanitärer Hilfe und militärischer Krisenintervention. Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, Beiträge Nr. 41, Januar 2003.

What does the EU do? (1/2)

- Commission and Secretariat of the Council envisage a "culture of co-ordination" that primarily refers to making all EU-intern actors work together in all phases of a given crisis and name this "CMCO". Implementing this culture is more urgent than e.g. defining CIMIC-procedures derived from a CMCs CMCO provisions
  cf. Council of the European Union: Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO). Brussels,
  7. November 2003, 14457/0

- Best practice for devising a tailor-sized (political-strategic) CMC by involving all ESDP bodies: PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM as well as internal stake-holders

- Crisis Response Co-Ordination Teams (CRCTs) to link this process via Secretary General/High Representative of CFSP (SG/HR) to Commission activities

- Open question: locus of control for civil-military interaction at the political-strategic level

What does the EU do? (2/2)

- CMC contains discrete options: civil strategic option (CSO), police strategic option (PSO), military strategic option (MSO), EC Measures
- This leaves it to the PSC to do something like CMNEW at the level of the CONOPS it presents to COREPER/GAERC
- Problem: Elaboration of MSO is largely done by a Crisis Action Team (CAT) in the Council Secretariat, so CMCO with the commission strongly depends on inter-personal interlocking
- Next level for co-ordinating efforts already is the tactical-operational level: EUSR as chairman of an in-operation co-ordinating group whose advice to take into account the Force Commander is requested
- Only civil heads of mission report to PSC via EUSR so that he can report to SG/HR
- How then can CRCT "assist in ensuring full coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase"?

How does the EU do? (1/2)

Example of a frame of reference: EUMC assessment/brenchmarks

Cf. EU's Challenge to Guarantee Civil-Military Co-ordination in Its Future Field Operations. Intervention of General Gustav Hägglund, Chairman European Union Military Committe at the Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology. Helsinki, 30. September 2002, www.itcm.org/pdf/Hagglund_EUMC.pdf, S. 4.

- CMCO is the implementation of comprehensive crisis management

- CMCO is an overarching task that needs to be accomplished at each step of a crisis in its whole range

- CMCO therefore includes co-ordination within the EU and with third actors

- CMCO would require common civil-military planning, doctrine development, training, networked early warning, civil-military information management etc.

My conclusions from this are:

- CMCO needs to be generalized and detached from CMCs

- When discussion models for civil-military interaction, we need to make the conceptual step from rather case-by-case, environmentally conditioned CMCO (political-strategic) and CIMIC (operational) to **systematic civil-military net-working ("CMNEW")**

- Wide range of models is available which the EU should carefully examine

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What would the EU need? (1/3)

- EU needs to re-interpret its decision-autonomy approach and closer look into existing CMNEW-suited concepts
- EU needs to appreciate that CMCO and CIMIC should be **vertically integrated** into a CMNEW approach
- CMNEW is a **complex management task** and not merely a matter of CMC and tactical doctrine
- Cf. Julian Lindley-French: The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century, in: European Security 13 (2004), no. 1-2, pp. 1-15.

What would the EU need? (2/3)

## CMNEW as a complex management task involves

- matching available ESDP instruments, other EU instruments and third-party instruments with a civil-military end-state strategy – in a way that is flexible enough to meet operational requirements and universal enough to help enact the Union's guiding norms (e.g. as defined in the ESS)
- civil-military, military-military and civil-civil interaction – both within in EU system and "combined"
- following principles comparable to those of network-centric operations: Increase the effects of existing single potentials and instruments, rather than increasing the amount of potentials and instruments

What would the EU need? (3/3)

- acknowledging that we typically will not be in a position to choose one or the other model for civil-military interaction but have to consider the co-operative culture a work in the field

- understanding and communicating civil-military interaction as an ingredient of any successful PSO, not merely as a technical instrument etc.

- appreciating that civil-military interaction needs to be vertically integrated to let it contribute to the paradigm of transformation:
    - There is no sustainable SSR without a vertically integrated plan for CMNEW in PSOs
    - There is no sustainable CIMIC without common decision-making procedures, that is political-military transformation defined in a CMC or, better, Common Strategy

Some of the identified concepts of CMNEW-value

1. **Nordic CMCO**

2. **CMCoord**
   de-linking civil and military components so to create a humanitarian space

3. **HQ-based CIMIC-groups**
   CIMIC personell (dual experts) located at the strategic-operational level

4. **ZMZ (Bw)**
   in-operation functional specialists, homeland-security use

5. **NRF model**
   militarily framed multi-national civil-military component system, cf. EUSEC DR Congo

6. **Integrated approach**
   domestic agency networking ("military forces work with their national counterparts"), cf. GB,
   CPA (DK – horizontal and vertical networking!), START (CA)…; institutional memory and information sharing; however:
   gain of coherence rather at the national than the EU level

7. **Multi-national joint planning**

8. **SHIRBRIG**
   role of SRSG, combination of operational diversification and informational co-ordination designed for initial entry and
   enabling forces

CMNEW: towards a definition

Starting point for a definition of CMNEW could be „Nordic CMCO"

as exemplyfied by NO-MOE/NORADs TfP in Africa. TfP co-operates with ACCORD, NUPI and ISS

„The success of modern peace operations depend on the effective coordination and synchronization of various functions, organizations and disciplines – providing a safe & secure environment, negotiating a comprehensive political settlement, embarking on a political transformation process including perhaps a new constitution and establishing new political institutions, organising an election, the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, re-establishing the state infrastructure, re-establishing essential services, security sector reform, justice sector reform, reconstruction of physical infrastructure, etc. […] Coordination occurs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and all the various components are involved." (http://www.trainingforpeace.org/themes/civmil.htm)

TfP: Training for Peace Programme
NORAD: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ACCORD: African Centre for Constructive Resolutions of Disputes (ACCORD)
NUPI: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs

Conclusion/outlook

- CMNEW is vertical, horizontal and multi-level
- CMNEW needs to be a political strategy as opposed to a political label
- CMNEW's added value needs to be clearly defined and verifiable
- CMNEW is already a task for prevention and must not only enter the agenda on the stage of an approaching intervention
- In the final analysis, CMNEW must be capable of including local actors, which also applies to warlords and irregular forces
- CMNEW should follow Huntington's principle of "objective civilian control", i.e. not blur the lines between peace-engineering and military professionalism: Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. […] The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism".

Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA 1957, p. 83.

Thank you and see you!

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